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I. INTRODUCTION
In The ContractualFoundation of Family-Business Law, Benjamin Means
aspires to lay the groundwork for a law of family businesses. 1 Family-business
law is not a "law of the horse," 2 but governs a distinctive factual context at the
intersection of two important legal forms-the family and the business
organization-each of which is animated by its own set of policies and
regulated by its own set of rules. This article is another fascinating
contribution to Means's long-term project of rationalizing the law of family
businesses. In this brief essay, I suggest that a workable family-business law
along the lines suggested by Means is consistent with an overarching policy in
the United States of promoting entrepreneurial action, 3 and I evaluate the
proposal against this policy goal, with particular attention to Means's
arguments in favor of "family-business defaults" and his concern over the
potentially disruptive role of fiduciary law.

* Glen

L. Farr Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young

University.

1Benjamin Means, The ContractualFoundation of Family-Business Law, 75 OHIO

ST. L.J.2 675 (2014).
See Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback:
Reflections on the Organizationof Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REv. 71, 71, 79 (2008) (arguing that
"the value of creating or maintaining a field of legal study turns on the distinctiveness of
the factual context").
3D. Gordon Smith & Darian M. Ibrahim, Law and Entrepreneurial Opportunities,
98 CORNELL L. REv. 1533, 1536 (2013).
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II. FAMILY-BUSINESS LAW
Family-business law is about the internal affairs of a business organization

in which "effective control of the business rests in family hands and that at
least two family members be involved as owners or managers." 4 When
disputes arise in family businesses, courts strive to implement the relevant
policies and apply the relevant rules, but the clash of family law and business
law often creates confusion. As Means observes, "Whether the issue is
divorce, inheritance, or the operation of a family trust that owns business
assets, family law can have a considerable influence on business law
outcomes." 5 The inconsistency of outcomes that typifies the status quo
"interferes with rational business planning and invites arbitrage across
6
doctrinal categories by sophisticated parties."
Means proposes to address this set of problems by extending the
contractarian model of business organizations to include marital agreements,
trust instruments, and inheritance contracts among participants in the business
organization. 7 Placing family businesses on a contractual foundation should
increase the predictability of outcomes, assuming that courts are reasonably
consistent in discerning the expectations of contracting parties from explicit
contracts and in applying appropriate default rules in the absence of explicit
contracts. Even though "[f]amily objectives are not necessarily what a rational
actor would formulate," 8 the effect of this enhanced predictability of outcomes
9
should be to encourage the formation of family businesses.
III. ENTREPRENEURIAL ACTION

In arguing for predicable outcomes, Means is echoing the work of Max
Weber, 10 Willard Hurst, 11 Douglass North, 12 Hernando de Soto, 13 Rule of Law

4
5
6

7

Means, supra note 1, at 690.
jd. at 677.
Jd. at 730.
1d. at 713.

8

jd. at 678 n.14.
Generally speaking, we assume that predictability mitigates the potential for
opportunism, thus encouraging action. See generally D. Gordon Smith & Brayden G. King,
Contracts as Organizations, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 15-19 (2009) (describing incomplete
contract theory).
102 MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 641-900 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich
eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1968).
9

11 JAMES WILLARD

HURST,

LAW

AND THE

CONDITIONS

OF

FREEDOM

IN THE

NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES 7 (1956).
12DouGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE 3 (1990).
13

HERNANDO DE SOTO,

THE

MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN

THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE 5-6 (2000).
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scholars, 14 Legal Origins Theory, 15 and others, 16 who contend that within a
"framework of reasonably predictable consequences," private actors are
"likely to cultivate boldness and energy in action."' 17 Max Weber famously
made the case for predictable legal outcomes as a foundation for economic
development, asserting that "the increasing calculability of the functioning of
the legal process ... constituted one of the most important conditions for the
18
existence of. . . capitalistic enterprise. "
Stability is not the only attribute of a legal system that encourages
entrepreneurial action. Novelty is a distinguishing attribute of entrepreneurial
20
action, 19 and novel things or novel behaviors "stretch the fabric of law."1
Legal systems that adapt well to novelty, therefore, should have an advantage
in economic development. Legal Origins Theory embraces this adaptability
hypothesis, 2 1 holding that "legal traditions differ in their ability to evolve with
changing conditions and legal traditions that adapt efficiently to minimize the
gap between the contracting needs of the economy and the legal system's
capabilities will foster financial development more effectively than more rigid
22
systems."
The need for stability and the need for adaptability are in tension. As noted
by Andreas Engert and Gordon Smith, "the more responsive a legal system,
the less people can rely on legal authority to predict how the law is going to
deal with their behavior." 23 The tension between stability and adaptability can
be reconciled by private ordering. Where the stability of a legal system
emboldens planning, contracting parties can adjust their relationships to
account for new behavioral or technological developments. Thus, a legal
system that exhibits stability in positive law encourages private ordering,
which is the locus of adaptability. This is consistent with Means's aspirations
for contractual default rules, which "could serve as a resource for the parties,
generating a set of preferred outcomes and facilitating more particular
14

(2007).
15

E.g., John K.M. Ohnesorge, The Rule of Law, 3 ANN.

REV.

L. & Soc. SCI. 99, 100

See Rafael La Porta et al., The Economic Consequences of Legal Origins, J. EcON.

LITERATURE 285, 286 (2008).
16
See, e.g., GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION
OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916, at 179 (1963); 1 WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE COMMON
LAW IN COLONIAL AMERICA: THE CHESAPEAKE AND NEW ENGLAND, 1607-1660, at 3-13

(2008).
17

HURST, supra note 11, at 22.
WEBER, supra note 10, at 883.
19JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, TIHE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 74-76
18

(Redvers
Opie trans., 1934).
20
Andreas Engert & D. Gordon Smith, Unpacking Adaptability, 2009 BYU L. REV.
1553,2 11554.
See La Porta et al., supra note 15, at 326.
22
Thorsten Beck et al., Law and Finance: Why Does Legal Origin Matter?, 31 J.
COMp.2 3ECON. 653, 655 (2003) (citation omitted).
Engert & Smith, supra note 20, at 1561.
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24

IV. ENTREPRENEURIAL ORGANIZATIONS
Promoting entrepreneurial action is a fundamental goal of the U.S. legal
system, 25 and family businesses are an important source of entrepreneurial
activity. Indeed, Means begins his article by noting, "Most U.S. businesses are
family owned."'26 We could imagine various incentives to encourage the
formation of family businesses, but Means has chosen to focus on issues
relating to the internal affairs of the business organization. It is hard to imagine
a better starting place, as the formation of firms is fundamental to the
promotion of entrepreneurial action. An entrepreneurship scholar noted
perceptively, "At the most general level, entrepreneurship is the creation of
'2 7
value through the creation of organization.
Broadly speaking, governments have two strategies for facilitating or
28
impeding the formation of firms: reducing burdens or increasing subsidies.
These strategies are often associated with the taxation system, but many forms
of regulation impose costs on businesses, and many features of the legal
system act as a form of subsidy for business transactions. 29 For example,
modern legal systems facilitate the creation of firms by providing a range of
off-the-shelf business forms, which offer easy access to governance rules and
(usually) limited liability for the firm's owners. These business forms provide
a set of default rules that can be tailored to the particular needs of the
participants.
Firms are legal instruments that grease the wheels of entrepreneurial
action, not only through default rules but through the flexibility enabled by
fiduciary law. Constructed on a foundation laid by the law of agency, 30 which
enables the entrepreneur to appoint representatives to act on the entrepreneur's
behalf,3 1 firms empower entrepreneurs to get more things done.32 As the price
24

Means, supra note 1, at 679.
25 Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 1536.
26
Means, supra note 1, at 676.
27
BARBARA J. BIRD, ENTREPRENEURIAL BEHAVIOR 3 (1989).
2 8
Andr6 van Stel et al., The Effect of Business Relations on Nascent and Young
Business
Entrepreneurship,28 SMALL Bus. ECON. 171, 171 (2007).
29
See Smith & Ibrahim, supra note 3, at 1551 (observing that the "state's role [in]
secur[ing] property rights and reduc[ing] the risks associated with venturing [is] ... a form
of subsidy
for business transactions" (footnote omitted)).
30
See ERIC W. ORTS, BuSINESS PERSONS: A LEGAL THEORY OF THE FIRM 54 (2013)

("Firms of any complexity beyond a single individual cannot exist without the law of
agency.").
31
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 (AM. LAW INST. 2006) ("Agency is the
fiduciary relationship that arises when one person (a 'principal') manifests assent to
another person (an 'agent') that the agent shall act on the principal's behalf and subject to
the principal's control, and the agent manifests assent or otherwise consents so to act.").
The law of agency is recognized by all modern legal systems. See W. Mtjller-Freienfels,
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of this power, the law of agency demands that the entrepreneur be subjected to
potential liabilities, including both outward looking liabilities (between the
entrepreneur and third parties) and inward-looking liabilities (between the
entrepreneur and another participant in the firm). 33 Thus, embedded within the

entrepreneur's decision to create a firm is a (perhaps unconscious) decision to
yield some control to other participants in the firm and to accept responsibility
for their actions. 34 Both default rules and fiduciary law facilitate this
delegation of authority.
V. DEFAULT RULES
Placing all of this in the context of a family poses special challenges for
the participants. As noted by Means, "When parents and children are also
coworkers, connections rooted in family life must be adjusted to meet the
obligations of the workplace." 3 5 Typical entrepreneurs concerned about having
responsibility for the actions of their representatives may expend resources to
incentivize and monitor the performance of those representatives, 36 but these
expenditures may seem unnecessary in family businesses, where family ties
"establish a background of trust that can reduce the transaction costs of
37
forming and operating a firm."
Law of Agency, 6 AM. J. COMp. L. 165, 165 (1957) ("Agency is recognized in all modern
legal 3systems
as an indispensable part of the existing social order.").
2
JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 132 (Routledge
5th ed. 1976) (1942) (observing that entrepreneurship "consists in getting things done").
On the benefits of agency, see Samuel Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through
Intermediaries,85 VA. L. REv. 1627, 1636 (1999), observing that "[h]iring an agent simply
allows
us to do more."
33
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY

§ 1.01 cmt. c ("Agency... entails inward-

looking consequences, operative as between the agent and the principal, as well as
outward-looking consequences, operative as among the agent, the principal, and third
parties with whom the agent interacts.").
34These are costs that are distinctive to a firm, as opposed to transactions through
markets. In both firms and markets, the entrepreneur must pay for services, expend
resources for supervision, and protect against self-interested behavior of the other party.
The firm is distinctive from markets because the entrepreneur grants discretion over firm
resources to other participants in the firm, who then become fiduciaries of the firm. See D.
Gordon Smith, The CriticalResource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399,
1403 (2002) [hereinafter Smith, Critical Resource Theory] (observing that "a fiduciary
exercises discretion with respect to a critical resource belonging to the beneficiary, whereas
most contracting parties exercise discretion only with respect to their own performance

under3 the
contract").
5

Means, supra note 1, at 692.
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. EcoN. 305, 308 (1976) ("The
principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for
the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to limit the aberrant activities of the
agent."
(emphasis omitted)).
37
Means, supra note 1, at 709.
36
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Of course, the law of business organizations provides additional comfort.
With regard to outward-looking liabilities, all modern legal systems offer
firms with limited liability, which caps financial liability at the value of the
entrepreneur's investment in the firm. 38 With regard to inward-looking
liabilities, we rely heavily on a robust fiduciary law to constrain participants in
a firm. In the end, however, Means argues that the primary bulwark against
opportunism in the family firm is contract: "because the economic concerns of
business and family do not reside in separate spheres, contractual adjustments
'39
can help to clarify the parties' expectations.
Means examines marital agreements, 40 trust instruments, 4 1 and inheritance
contracts, 4 2 all of which may provide explicit guidance in dispute resolution.
The more ambitious part of his paper, however, is the last section, which
proposes the development of default rules and interpretive principles
consistent with the parties' business and family relationships. His decision to
promote the use of default rules seems natural, given the contractarian frame
of the overall approach, but the choice of default rules represents a conscious
rejection of mandatory rules that are often imposed in family-business cases
currently. For Means this is pragmatic decision to elevate the expectations of
the participants in the family business, 4 3 but it also serves to encourage
entrepreneurial action.
Legal commands take the form of rules or standards. 44 The archetypal rule
is a numerical speed limit, whereas the exemplary standard requires
"reasonable and prudent" driving. 4 5 Lewis Kaplow famously described the
38

See World Bank Grp., Entrepreneurship Dataset, DOING BusINEss,
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploretopics/entrepreneurship/ [https ://perma.cc/7DN7N5PA; https://perma.cc/J4UR-SMSS] (explaining on the "Methodology" page that the data
was collected from "newly registered companies with limited liability (or its equivalent)"
in 136 countries for the period 2004-2012).
39Means, supra note 1, at 710.
40

1d. at 717 ("[N]o family-business plan is complete unless it takes into account
possible
disruptions of family relationships, including divorce.").
41
Id. at 718 ("[W]hen trust law overlaps with business -organization law, the vital
question is whether there is some appropriate mechanism for coordinating the parties'
rights and obligations.").
42
Id. at 721 (' [P]rivate ordering regarding the transfer of family wealth can establish
the functional equivalent of a work-to-own employment agreement.").
4 3
Id. at 731 ("Ultimately, the goal is to support the voluntary participation of family

members
in a shared venture by protecting their expectations.").
44

The reduction of legal commands to two types is a rather recent conceptualization.
See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1685-87 (1976) (matching "two opposed rhetorical modes for dealing with
substantive issues, which I will call individualism and altruism," with "two opposed modes
for dealing with questions of the form in which legal solutions to the substantive problems

should
be cast," namely, rules and standards).
45

See Robert E. King & Cass R. Sunstein, Doing Without Speed Limits, 79 B.U. L.
REv. 155, 155-56 (1999) (describing Montana's experience in moving from a rule to a
standard).
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difference between rules and standards as "the extent to which efforts to give
content to the law are undertaken before or after individuals act."146 A legal
policymaker who is keen to promote entrepreneurial action should generally
prefer default rules, which imply the possibility of waiver to account for
tailored deviations from the normal form of organization. The superiority of
this form of regulation over mandatory rules in the family-business context is
clear, as mandatory rules entrench a particular vision of the interaction of
family and business that undoubtedly would conflict with the preferences of
many.
It has also been argued that default rules are generally preferable to
standards in promoting action because rules reduce uncertainty. 4 7 In the case
of entrepreneurial action, certainty is not necessarily a virtue, as an innovative
challenge to the status quo may be expressly prohibited by the default rule, and
the waiver may be difficult or expensive to obtain. But default rules probably
make more sense in the family-business context, where the most salient
problems do not concern innovation, but integration of the family into the
business.
VI. FIDUCIARY LAW
Contracts play an important role in governing family businesses, but
fiduciary relationships have a distinctive structure, relying partially on the
logic of contract and partially on the logic of property. 48 This is easily seen in
the context of family trusts, which often are used in the family-business
context to control the family-business assets. 4 9 The crucial feature of family
trusts-indeed, of all fiduciary relationships-is the exercise of authority by
the fiduciary (trustee) over resources belonging to the beneficiaries. While the
beneficiaries and fiduciary often have a contractual relationship in the form of
a trust instrument, the duties imposed on the fiduciary are designed to protect
the resources of the beneficiaries. 50
Because fiduciaries exercise their discretion over the trust assets in the
46

Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557,
560 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
47John E. Calfee & Richard Craswell, Some Effects of Uncertainty on Compliance
with Legal Standards, 70 VA. L. REv. 965, 966-67 (1984).
48See D. Gordon Smith, Firms and Fiduciaries, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND
FIDUCIARY LAW (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., forthcoming 2016) (manuscript
at 2), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2729657 [https://perma.cc/S89V-RQEP] [hereinafter Smith,
Firms and Fiduciaries] ('[W]hile some features of fiduciary relationships are traceable to
the logic of contract and some features are traceable to the logic of property, fiduciary
relationships
are unique hybrid institutions .... ).
49
Means, supra note 1, at 699 ("[T]he family owners might create a trust to effectuate
a transition, because it is possible to allocate company stock and managerial control to one
or more members of the family without depriving other family members of business
profits.").
50
See Smith, Firms and Fiduciaries,supra note 48.
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face of incomplete trust instruments, 5 1 beneficiaries in fiduciary relationships
are vulnerable to opportunism. The potential for opportunism in the fiduciary
context-as opposed to a relationship of arm's-length contracting parties-is
particularly acute because the fiduciary is authorized to exercise discretion
over resources belonging to the beneficiaries, whereas "contracting parties
exercise discretion only with respect to their own performance under the
contract."'52 The duty of loyalty requires fiduciaries to sacrifice their own selfinterest on behalf of the beneficiaries of the duty to protect those beneficiaries
53
from opportunism by the fiduciaries.
The duty of loyalty is common to all fiduciary relationships, 54 but courts
tailor the duty to specific contexts. In the family trust context, the trustee has a
"duty to administer the trust solely in the interest of the beneficiaries," and to
"deal fairly" with the beneficiaries. 55 This duty is said to be "strict," meaning
that the trustee is prohibited from engaging in transactions that involve a
conflict of interest, unless, among other things, the trustee receives court
authorization, the terms of the trust expressly authorize such transactions, or
the beneficiaries consent to such transactions. 56 In these circumstances, "a
trustee [still] violates the duty of loyalty to the beneficiaries by acting in bad
57
faith or unfairly."
Means worries about potential conflicts between the fiduciary duty of a
trustee and the fiduciary duty of a business manager. 58 According to Means,
"the default duty of loyalty owed by a trustee requires disgorgement of all
profits, even if the dealings were fair," while a controlling shareholder "is
entitled to benefit from the share ownership as long as any self-interested
transactions are fair to the other shareholders." 59 Means correctly observes,
"The inconsistency of fiduciary obligations becomes especially problematic
when a family member is empowered as trustee to manage a family business
60
for the benefit of other members of the family."
While Means would rely on the contractual conception of the firm to
clarify the trustee's role in these circumstances, 61 the fiduciary law governing
51

See D. Gordon Smith & Jordan C. Lee, FiduciaryDiscretion,75 OHIO ST. L.J. 609,
615-16 (2014).
52
Smith, CriticalResource Theory, supra note 34, at 1403.
53
Id.at 1407.
54
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2003) ("Despite
the differences in the legal circumstances and responsibilities of various fiduciaries, one
characteristic is common to all: a person in a fiduciary relationship to another is under a
duty to
act for the benefit of the other as to matters within the scope of the relationship.").
55
1d. § 78.
56
1d. § 78 cmts. c(1), c(2) & c(3).
57
1d. § 78 cmt. c(2).
58
Means, supra note 1, at 700 ("In trust-controlled businesses, the law of trusts
supplements
and can even supersede otherwise applicable business law.").
59
6

1d. at 718.

0

d.

611Id. at

719.
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trustees makes allowance for these sorts of inherent conflicts of interest. As
noted in the foregoing discussion of general fiduciary principles in the trust
context, notions of "fairness" infuse fiduciary law, but the trustee's duty of
impartiality (mentioned briefly by Means as a limit on the "beneficiary's
practical ability to challenge trust distributions" 62) is a doctrine that seems
specially designed to facilitate action. Whenever a trust has two or more
beneficiaries, as is often the case in family businesses, the trustee has a duty of
impartiality with regard to those beneficiaries. 63 The duty of impartiality is
said to be an "extension" of the duty of loyalty, 64 but impartiality is different
from the traditional duty of loyalty in an important way. As illustrated in the
following diagram, the duty of loyalty regulates vertical conflicts between the
trustee and the beneficiaries, while the duty of impartiality regulates horizontal
conflicts between two or more beneficiaries.
Figure 1: Duty of Loyalty and Duty of Impartiality
Trustee

Duty of Loyalty

Beneficiary

>

<

Beneficiary

Duty of Impartiality
The duty of impartiality applies to all of the decisions of a trustee, from
the making or retention of investments to the management of trust property to
the discretionary distribution of trust funds. 65 Trust beneficiaries often have
competing economic interests, and when they do, the issue of impartiality is
unavoidable. Impartiality does not connote strict equality among the
beneficiaries, but the trustee is to act without "personal favoritism or animosity
toward individual beneficiaries." 66 In balancing the competing interests of the
beneficiaries, the trustee may "reasonably reflect any preferences and priorities
that are discernible from the terms, purposes, and circumstances of the trust
67
and from the nature and terms of the beneficial interests."
62
6 3

64

jd. at

701.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS

§ 79 cmt. b.
65
Id.§ 79 cmt. a.
66
jd. § 79 cmt. b.
6 7
1d. (citation omitted).
jj.

§ 79 (AM.

LAW INST.

2003).
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Recognizing the difficult position of the trustee with respect to the duty of
impartiality, trust law allows for a "range of... reasonable fiduciary
judgment. 6 8 Fiduciary duty is a "doctrine of last resort," meaning that it is
"activated only when all other potentially applicable commands from
constitutions, statutes, regulations, ordinances, common law decisions and
contracts have been exhausted. '69 In the family trust context, "a power is
discretionary except to the extent its exercise is directed by the terms of the
trust or compelled by the trustee's fiduciary duties." '70 Courts review a
trustee's exercise of discretion under an "abuse of discretion" standard. 7 1 An
abuse of discretion occurs when decisions by the trustee are made in bad faith
or with improper motive. 72 Evidence of such action is that a decision of the
trustee is "beyond the bounds of a reasonable judgment. '73 Generally
speaking, therefore, 'judicial intervention is not warranted merely because the
74
court would have differently exercised the discretion."
VII. CONCLUSION
Entrepreneurial action requires organization, and the locus of organization
is often the family. In his latest paper on "family-business law," Benjamin
Means offers an original, challenging, and provocative new perspective on
family businesses. The thesis-that "a firm includes not just business
contracts, but all bargains among participants that affect the business
enterprise" 75-seems, at first glance, rather obvious, but Professor Means
takes pains to explain how the contract-based nature of business relationships
often is in tension with the status-based nature of families. He argues
simultaneously that family businesses are deeply contractual, even though
family members should not be forced "to bargain at arm's length and to
rethink all aspects of their mutual relationships. " 76 He ultimately concludes
that our legal system should attempt to fulfill the expectations of the relevant
77
parties in resolving disputes by developing "family-business defaults."
Although I endorse this proposal, I also defend the flexibility and ingenuity of
fiduciary law in resolving disputes in a manner that promotes action.

681Id.
69

D. Gordon Smith, Doctrines of Last Resort, in REVISITING THE CONTRACTS

SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY 426, 427 (Jean Braucher et al. eds., 2013).
70
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 87 cmt. a.
71
72

1d. § 87.
1d. § 87 cmt. c.

731Id.
74

1d. § 87 cmt. b.

75
76
77

Means, supra note 1, at 678.
jd. at 712.
1d. at 723-30.

